INTELLIGENCE BRIEF — STRAIT OF HORMUZ SHIPPING STATUS
CLASSIFICATION: OPEN SOURCE | CONFIDENCE: HIGH (8/10) | DATE: 18 MAR 2026
I. SITUATION
The Strait of Hormuz is not closed. But it might as well be.
Transit volume has dropped 61% since hostilities began. Pre-conflict baseline: 21 million barrels per day through the strait, representing roughly 20% of global oil consumption. Current estimated throughput: 8.2 million bbl/day and falling.
The chokepoint is 21 miles wide at its narrowest. Shipping lanes are 2 miles wide in each direction, separated by a 2-mile buffer. Iran controls the northern shore and several islands — Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb — that provide direct line-of-sight and weapons range over both transit lanes.
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Vessels stranded/diverted | 157 |
| Ships attacked (confirmed) | 23 |
| Ships sunk or disabled | 4 |
| Crew casualties (est.) | 12 KIA, 40+ WIA |
| War risk insurance premium | +1,200% (from 0.05% to 0.65% hull value) |
| Brent crude (spot) | $127.40 |
| Daily throughput (current est.) | ~8.2M bbl/day (vs 21M baseline) |
| LNG carrier transits (last 7 days) | 3 (vs ~35 normal) |
II. THREAT VECTORS
Anti-ship missiles: Iran has deployed Noor (C-802 derivative), Qader, and Khalij Fars anti-ship ballistic missiles along the coastline. The Khalij Fars has a claimed range of 300km and is specifically designed as a carrier killer, though its actual accuracy against moving targets remains unverified in combat.
Fast attack craft: IRGC Navy operates 1,500+ fast inshore attack craft (FIACs) armed with rockets, machine guns, and in some cases anti-ship missiles. These swarm tactics are designed to overwhelm point defenses. At least 8 FIAC engagements have been reported since Day 7.
Naval mines: The most underreported threat. Iran has an estimated stockpile of 5,000-6,000 naval mines including EM-52 rocket-propelled rising mines. Even a limited mining of the shipping lanes would require weeks of minesweeping operations. UKMTO and CENTCOM have not confirmed active mining, but two vessel hull breaches in the last 96 hours have characteristics consistent with mine damage.
Drone warfare: Iranian-manufactured Shahed and Ababil drones have been deployed against commercial shipping. Low cost ($20,000-50,000 per unit), high volume, difficult to intercept at scale. 6 confirmed drone strikes on commercial vessels.
III. IMPLICATIONS
Global energy supply chains are functioning on the assumption that this disruption is temporary. That assumption is increasingly fragile.
Major shipping companies — Maersk, MSC, CMA CGM — have suspended Hormuz transits. Lloyd's of London war risk committees meet daily. Japanese refiners are rerouting supply through the Strait of Malacca, adding 15-20 days to delivery timelines. Saudi Arabia is pushing capacity through the East-West Pipeline (5M bbl/day max) and the Yanbu terminal on the Red Sea, but Houthi activity makes that alternative route only marginally safer.
If throughput drops below 5M bbl/day for 72+ hours, expect coordinated SPR releases from IEA member states and potential fuel rationing in import-dependent economies (Japan, South Korea, India).
IV. WATCHLIST
72-hour indicators: IRGC mine-laying activity near Abu Musa, LNG carrier transits (canary in the coal mine), Lloyd's war risk premium movements, and CENTCOM freedom-of-navigation statements.
— Argus Intelligence | The Collective
